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BAKER, BUSH, AND BALLOT BOARDS:
THE FEDERALIZATION OF ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
Daniel Tokaji †
Owen Wolfe ††
INTRODUCTION
“We conclude that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal
protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action . . . . The
right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 1 So wrote Justice William Brennan in
Baker v. Carr, a case that heralded a new era in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s election law jurisprudence. There are many dimensions to
Baker. The most obvious is the lifting of the barrier on judicial
involvement in redistricting through its redefinition of the political
question doctrine.2 This set the stage for extensive federal judicial
intervention in the process of drawing districts, first through Reynolds

† Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated Professor in Law at The Ohio State
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law; Senior Fellow, Election Law @ Moritz; and CoEditor of the Election Law Journal.
†† Juris Doctor Candidate, 2012, at The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College
of Law. Thank you to Scott Bent, Mandy Mallott, and Ashlee Wolfe for their helpful comments
on an earlier draft of the article.
1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
2 Id. at 217 (adopting a six-part test for ascertaining whether a nonjusticiable political
question exists). For commentary on Baker’s redefinition of the doctrine, to allow the Court to
hear a wider range of claims, see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the
Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 103–5 (2001); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable
Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2002); Michael R. Kelly, Note, Revisiting
and Revising the Political Question Doctrine: Lane v. Haliburton and the Need to Adopt a
Case-Specific Political Question Analysis for Private Military Contractor Cases, 29 MISS. C. L.
REV. 219, 229–30 (2010).
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v. Sims 3 and the other “one person, one vote” cases, and ultimately
through enactment and judicial application of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (“VRA”).4 We might call this series of developments the
“federalization of redistricting.”
Important as Baker’s ramifications for the drawing of legislative
districts were, they are not our primary focus here. This Article will
instead address the broader impact of Baker v. Carr in making the
federal courts important players in the electoral process. Our specific
focus is on the federal judiciary’s increasingly important role in
election administration. By election administration, we mean the set
of electoral practices—from voting machines, to voter ID, to
provisional ballots, to voter registration—that were mostly ignored by
the general public and most scholars before 2000, but have since
become hugely important in both realms. Until 2000, election
administration was almost exclusively a matter of state law and local
practice, with a very limited federal overlay. While election
administration is still mostly a matter of state law and local practice,
the federal government—especially its courts—plays a more
significant role today than was the case in the last century.
Several related developments account for this increased federal
presence in election administration: (1) more federal litigation,
including claims arising under the U.S. Constitution and (2) greater
public attention to this set of issues, which led to (3) enactment of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), 5 the most comprehensive
(if not most significant) 6 federal intervention in election
administration in American history, which in turn led to (4) more
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa–6
(2006)); see also Allison H. Eid, A Spotlight on Structure, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 911, 918 (2001)
(noting how some of the Baker-Reynolds doctrine created the “backbone” of the VRA).
5 Pub. L. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545). For
more on HAVA, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1214–20
(2005) (describing in detail the provisions of HAVA).
6 We say “most comprehensive” because it touched on so many aspects of election
administration, including voting technology, voter registration, provisional voting, voter
identification, poll workers, and the standards for counting votes. The award for “most
significant” must go to the VRA. See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Election Fraud and the
Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
889, 931 (2007) (referring to the VRA as “the most significant piece of federal legislation
protecting the voting rights of U.S. citizens . . .”); John M. Rosenberg, Personal Reflections of a
Life in Public Interest Law: From the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice to Appalred, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 317, 320 (1993) (noting that the VRA is “perhaps the
most significant piece of civil rights legislation ever to be passed . . .”). That being said, HAVA
is arguably the most significant piece of voting rights legislation since the VRA. See Brian Kim,
Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 579 (2003) (stating that lawmakers call
HAVA the most significant legislation since the VRA).
3
4
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federal statutory claims in federal court. This is the set of
developments that we collectively refer to as the “federalization of
election administration.”
To understand the (partial) federalization of American election
administration during the past decade, it is necessary to discuss
another big case, one that remains a brooding omnipresence hovering
over this area of election law: Bush v. Gore. 7 At the risk of
hyperbole—and with some caveats—we contend that Bush can be
seen as the new Baker. It set the stage for federal lower court judges
to play a much more active role in policing the administration of
elections, just as Baker did with the redistricting process decades
earlier. This is exemplified by the remarkable litigation over an
obscure judicial race in southwestern Ohio, which has resulted in
published decisions from both federal courts (Hunter v. Hamilton
County Board of Elections) 8 and a state court (Ohio ex rel. Painter v.
Brunner) 9—as well as a not-too-subtle struggle for power between
the federal and state courts. Underlying these cases is an extremely
important question concerning the authority of federal courts in
overseeing election administration.
We also argue that the increased federal court involvement in
election administration is a good thing, given that federal judges are
insulated from partisan politics in a manner that American electoral
institutions (and for that matter state judges) mostly are not. While
other countries have electoral institutions that enjoy some degree of
independence from partisan politics, we generally do not—certainly
not at the federal level, not at the state level, and mostly not at the
local level. Because of the federal courts’ relative insulation from
partisan politics, it is desirable that it play an active role in overseeing
federal elections. This role is a positive development and one that
partially stems from Baker as well as Bush.
Our argument regarding the partial federalization of election
administration proceeds in three parts. Part I revisits Baker v. Carr,
arguing that the case was really about federalism. What we mean by
this is not that it protected state sovereignty, but the opposite: that it
took state sovereignty off the table as a justification for the political
question doctrine and thereby transferred authority over redistricting
from state legislatures to federal courts. Part II suggests that Bush has
played a comparable—though not identical—role with respect to
election administration, resulting in a more active role for the federal
7
8
9

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
No. 1:10CV820, 2010 WL 4878957 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2010).
941 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 2011).
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judiciary in this realm. Part III argues that this is a good thing,
notwithstanding the tension it has created between the federal and
state courts, exemplified in Hunter. Federal courts do and should hold
the trump card in this nascent conflict, as they are the American
institution best-suited to adjudicate election-related disputes.
I. BAKER V. CARR AND FEDERALISM
In Baker, the Court was presented with a challenge to a legislative
apportionment map that had not been altered since 1901, despite
significant population growth and demographic changes in the
intervening six decades. 10 The majority held that the case was
justiciable. 11 It devoted a considerable portion of its opinion
distinguishing precedent that might be understood to require
otherwise. 12 Justices Felix Frankfurter wrote a vigorous dissent,
excoriating the majority for allegedly “revers[ing] a uniform course of
decision established by a dozen cases . . .[,] a massive repudiation of
the experience of our whole past . . . .” 13
Nowadays, we tend to focus on Baker’s significance in the
judicialization of redistricting—that is, in transferring power from
legislators to judges. But an equally important aspect of the case is the
federalization of redistricting, transferring power from the states to
the federal government. Put another way, Baker was important as
much for what it took away as for what it gave. It took away one of
the primary justifications—maybe the primary justification—for the
political question doctrine that had existed in prior decades: respect
for state sovereignty. 14 This opened the door to federal courts policing
the redistricting process, an area that was previously reserved for state
legislatures and courts.
To understand this dimension of Baker, it is helpful to review its
famous list of factors that define political questions:
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1962).
Id. at 237.
12 Id. at 208–37.
13 Id. at 266–67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
14 See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 1177 (stating that Baker cast aside the principle of
federalism); see also Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political
Question Doctrine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169, 176
(2006) (discussing Baker’s new focus on separation of powers and abandonment of federalism);
Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial
Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 212 (1987) (stating that Baker based its decision on federal
separation of powers instead of federalism); cf. Anya J. Stein, Note, The Guarantee Clause in
the States: Structural Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative
Power, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343, 349–50 (2010) (noting that the earlier political question
doctrine case Luther v. Borden rooted the political question doctrine in both separation of
powers and federalism).
10
11
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 15
What is missing from the list is respect for state sovereignty. Before
Baker, avoidance of infringement on state’s sovereign prerogatives
was one of the principal justifications for federal courts declining to
decide a case on political question grounds, as we explain below. But
after Baker, the political question doctrine is about separation of
powers, not federalism. 16
To grasp this change, it is helpful to compare Baker to
Luther v. Borden. 17 Luther arose out of the Dorr Rebellion. 18 The
conflict began when a constitutional convention was convened in
Rhode Island and purportedly created a new state government, while
the old government—still operating under the rules of a prerevolutionary, “unrepublican” English charter—declared martial law

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question
Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 603, 613–614 n.65 (2001) (stating that Baker made an “unprecedented assertion that
the political question doctrine concerned only separation of powers, not federalism . . .”); Martin
H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of
Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1987) (discussing judicial abstention in the area of
federalism); Sara Thompson, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit: Constitutional Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 706–7 (2006)
(stating that “the political question doctrine is grounded in separation of powers”); Ernest A.
Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating
Adjustments, 46 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1733, 1824–26 (2005) (discussing the fact that there
has been no significant effort to determine the Court’s jurisdiction over federalism questions
since Baker); Edward A. Stelzer, Note, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of
the Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 870 (1993) (discussing the nonjusticiability of
the guarantee clause);
17 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
18 See generally MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
RADICALISM 1833–1849 (1973) (a study of the Dorr Rebellion).
15
16
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to maintain power. 19 Plaintiffs wanted the Court to decide which of
two rival governments in Rhode Island was the legitimate one. 20 As
Chief Justice Roger Taney put it at the start of his opinion for the
Court, with no small amount of understatement, the case arose “out of
the unfortunate political differences which agitated the people of
Rhode Island in 1841 and 1842.” 21 The specific event precipitating
Luther was the breaking and entering the home of Martin Luther, a
leader of the new constitutional government (which had extended
voting rights to all men over twenty-one who had resided in the state
for one year), 22 by Luther Borden and other officials of the old charter
government (which had limited voting to freeholders).23 Luther
brought a trespass claim against the old government’s officials,
arguing that the trespass was illegal because the old government was
unlawful under the Republican Guarantee Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 24 Plaintiff thus sought to use the arrest as a vehicle for
obtaining a judicial determination of which government was the
legitimate one. The Court refused to take the bait, declaring the case
nonjusticiable.
What is most significant about Luther, for our purposes, is why the
Court refused to take the bait. Contrary to what one might think from
reading Baker’s description of Luther, the Court’s rationale was not
only, or even mainly, about separation of powers. 25 It was, instead,
grounded in federalism. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion mentions the
fact that “the political department has always determined whether the
proposed constitution . . . was ratified or not by the people of the
State, and the judicial power has followed its decision.” 26 But read in
context, it is clear that the opinion is referring to the political
department of the state, not the federal government. Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion proceeds to explain that, in Rhode Island, the
authority of the old government had been questioned in the course of
Luther, 48 U.S. at 3–9.
Id. at 1.
21 Id. at 34.
22 Id. at 10–12.
23 See id. at 6 (referring to the eligible voters as “freemen”).
24 See id. at 1–2; U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
25 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 218–22 (1962). Justice Brennan wrote that the Luther
court’s decision that the case was nonjusticiable was based on “several factors:” “the
commitment to the other branches of the decision as to which is the lawful state government; the
unambiguous action by the President, in recognizing the charter government as the lawful
authority; the need for finality in the executive's decision; and the lack of criteria by which a
court could determine which form of government was republican.” Id. at 222. Notice that Justice
Brennan did not include respect for state sovereignty as factor in that list, a clear—and perhaps
deliberate—misreading of Luther.
26 Luther, 48 U.S. at 39.
19
20

2012]

BAKER, BUSH, AND BALLOT BOARDS

975

criminal prosecutions of its opponents (including Dorr himself), but
the state courts concluded that “it rested with the political power to
decide whether the charter government had been displaced” and that
“according to the laws and institutions of Rhode Island, no such
change had been recognized.” 27 In other words, it was up to the
“political department” of the state’s government to determine whether
that government had been displaced.28 The Rhode Island state court
had recognized this, and the U.S Supreme Court emphasized “that the
courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State
courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of
the State.” 29
While the Constitution vests federal courts with power to decide
some disputes, the Luther Court stressed that “the power of
determining that a State government has been lawfully established . . .
is not one of them.” 30 Such a determination, Luther said, belongs to
the states. 31 Put simply, the U.S. Supreme Court deferred to the state
court, which, in turn, deferred to the political department of state
government on the pivotal question of whether that government was
lawfully established.
The question of which government was lawfully established was
not the only one best left to the state, in the Court’s view. As another
example, the Court noted that it “certainly . . . is no part of the judicial
functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the
qualification of voters in a State . . . nor has it the right to determine
what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to . . . .” 32
Therefore, the Court rhetorically asked, even if a federal court had
tried to take on this inquiry, “by what rule could it have determined”
the legitimacy of the dueling Rhode Island governments?33 To put it
into modern parlance, the Court suggested that respect for state power
is what precluded the federal courts from articulating a judicially
manageable standard under which the case could be decided.
Id.
The Court reasoned that Rhode Island state courts were necessarily bound to adhere to
the determination made by the political department of state government as to which government
was legitimate. If the state courts were to inquire into which government was legitimate, and to
conclude that the old government was illegitimate, then the power of the state court would
necessarily be “annulled with it.” Id. at 40. Because the state court’s authority derived from that
of the old government, a conclusion that this government was illegitimate would necessarily
mean that the state court itself was without power to issue a binding judgment.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 41.
33 See id. (questioning how the circuit court could have come to its determination without
a state law).
27
28

23

976

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4

After going on for several pages to this effect, the Court
emphatically rejects Luther’s invitation to second-guess state courts’
judgments on the proper government by stating: “The authority and
security of the State governments do not rest on such unstable
foundations.” 34 Only then do we get to a “[m]oreover,” at which point
the Court launches into its discussion of separation of powers—
specifically its conclusion that Congress, and not the federal courts,
have the power to determine which state government to recognize
under the U.S. Constitution. 35 We thus recognize that Luther is partly
rooted in separation of powers. Our point is that Luther’s primary
rationale was founded in federalism, while separation of powers was
secondary. As Anya Stein has argued, the Luther Court’s “emphasis
on federalism” rather than separation of powers in the first part of the
opinion was because the case was “centrally concerned [with]
political sovereignty,” specifically the authority of Rhode Island to
govern itself. 36
As originally written, then, Luther was mostly about federalism,
not separation of powers. Professor Robert Pushaw has cited nine
other political question opinions after Luther (not counting the per
curiam opinions that followed Colegrove v. Green) 37 grounded in
federalism. 38 Included in these cases are instances of the Court
declining to hear claims where the plaintiffs had argued “that states
had rendered their governments ‘unrepublican’ by (1) passing certain
laws by initiative rather than statute; (2) delegating legislative power
to executive agencies or courts; (3) enacting worker’s compensation
laws; (4) permitting a rule that statutes could be invalidated only if
every state court justice (or all but one) agreed; and (5) amending the
state constitution through certain procedures.” 39
Id. at 42.
See id. (discussing how the Constitution treats these issues as political in nature and
allows the “general government” to interfere with state concerns).
36 Stein, supra note 14, at 350 (noting that the Luther Court left the possibility that state
courts could be the venue to hear Guaranty Clause challenges).
37 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
38 Pushaw, supra note 2, at 1177 n.72.
39 Id. at 1169. Robert Post has examined one of the precedents noted by Professor
Pushaw, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), a case that “crafted [a] political
question doctrin[e] that . . . essentially precluded judicial oversight of the federalism
implications of the national spending power.” Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era:
Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1546 (2002). In that case, plaintiffs challenged a
federal law that would give grants to states that met particular criteria. Id. at 1545. The grants
would be used to improve health care for mothers and infants. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the
grants involved local issues and that the conditional nature of these grants would force states to
“‘yield a portion of their sovereign rights.’” Id. at 1546 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 479). The
court declined to hear these arguments, a decision based in part on the political question
doctrine. See id. (discussing how the court’s crafting of the political question doctrine prevents
judicial review of the federalism problems of national spending).
34
35
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The Baker Court recharacterized this line of cases as concerned
with separation-of-powers rather than federalism. It conspicuously
omitted respect for state sovereignty from the list of the factors that
Luther thought made a question nonjusticiable. Instead, Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the majority asserted that the only factors
motivating the Court in Luther were respect for Congress, respect for
the President, and the lack of judicially manageable standards for
resolving the dispute. 40 In so doing, Baker engaged in more than a
little sleight of hand. An honest reading of Luther and its progeny
reveals that federalism was an important part of the political question
doctrine. This mischaracterization of precedent led Justice Frankfurter
to accuse the majority of repudiating history. 41 Hyperbolic though
these accusations were, there was more than a kernel of truth in them.
To clarify, our point is not that Baker was wrong to do what it did.
In fact, we think that the federal courts intervention that followed
Baker was a very healthy thing. State legislators in places like
Tennessee and Alabama had no incentive to redraw state lines,
notwithstanding the enormous population shifts that had occurred,
because those state legislators benefitted from malapportioned
districts. Whatever state sovereignty interests existed, there was a
strong imperative for federal judicial intervention. This problem was
not going to fix itself. Thus, our argument is not that Baker was
wrong to define the political question doctrine, but that it did redefine
the doctrine. By taking respect for state sovereignty off the table as a
justification for application of the political question doctrine, Baker
did more than clarify the law; it changed it.42 And that change has
See supra note 25.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42 A few commentators, most notably Stephen Gottlieb, have argued that federalism
should be re-incorporated into the political question doctrine. Stephen E. Gottlieb, What
Federalism & Why? Science Versus Doctrine, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 47, 72 (2007) (asserting that, if
the Supreme Court truly wanted to adhere to the original compromise struck in the Constitution,
“[f]ederalism should be a prime instance of the political question doctrine that tells courts to
keep out.”). Interestingly, most of the scholarship on this aspect of the political question
doctrine seems aimed at reducing state sovereignty by preventing the courts from protecting
states from Congress, rather than protecting state sovereignty as Luther did. See, e.g., Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 101 (1984) (arguing that the political
question doctrine “should . . . be given more teeth” by expanding it “to include federalism
analysis.”); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 189 (1997) (discussing
how the Constitution informs social policy concerns); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court
Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1635–36 (1994) (noting that
courts do not necessarily need to enforce federalism if the states have adequate protection
through the political process, thus rendering federalism issues nonjusticiable). Justice David
Souter advocated this position as well in his dissent in U.S. v. Morrison. See U.S. v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 647–48 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The objection to reviving traditional state
spheres of action as a consideration in commerce analysis . . . only rests on the portent of
incoherence . . .”); see also Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water’s Edge: State
40
41
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endured. To this day, the political question doctrine is focused on
separation of powers, not federalism. 43
We are not the first commentators to note that Baker changed the
law by taking federalism off the table as a justification for the
political question doctrine.44 What is interesting is that, while many
have noted this aspect of Baker, most do not dwell on it—other than
to observe that federalism is missing from Baker’s test for what
counts as a political question. 45 The scholarship on this aspect of
Baker is limited. 46 But the partisan transfer of power over districting
from the states to the federal level is one of the most important
aspects of Baker’s legacy. In Part II, we explain how a similar
transfer has occurred in the area of election administration since
Bush v. Gore.
II. BUSH, THE NEW BAKER
By taking respect for state sovereignty off the table as a
justification for the political question doctrine, Baker v. Carr set the
stage for the federal judiciary’s more active involvement in the

Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 71 (2001) (noting Justice
Souter’s position). Justice Souter relied on a passage written by James Madison in Federalist
No. 46, arguing that federal judicial review is unnecessary in the context of state sovereignty
and federalism, because “[t]he National Government ‘will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of
the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of
their governments.’” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 648 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(second set of brackets in original).
43 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Deliberation: Comparative
Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 256–57 (1995)
(noting the idea that political pressures on Congress might justify courts declining to hear
federalism disputes as nonjusticiable, while also noting that this is not the Court’s current
position on the issue).
44 See, e.g., Graham O’Donoghue, Precatory Executive Statements and Permissible
Judicial Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,
1157 (2006) (noting that the political question doctrine is an “abstention doctrine”); Baker &
Young, supra note 2, at 103–05 (“To be sure, the political question doctrine has long stood for
the proposition that some constitutional issues are nonjusticiable despite the fact that they fall
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); Thompson, supra note 16, at 706–07 (discussing
how the court uses this doctrine “to avoid political questions”); Redish & Drizin, supra note 16,
at 36 (noting that the number of cases affected by the federal question doctrine would be greatly
increased if federalism issues increase); Young, supra note 16, at 1824–26 (discussing the
effects of Baker on the political question doctrine); Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the
Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 105–06 n.494 (2002) (“[F]ederalism concerns may
encompass doctrines like the political question doctrine, even if that doctrine is not specifically
applicable to federal-state relations.”).
45 See, e.g., Kristin Feeley, Comment, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected President, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1427, 1454–57 (2009) (discussing how certain aspects of federalism might be
justiciable); Baker & Young, supra note 2, at 105 (discussing when the court refuses to enforce
federalism constraints).
46 A notable exception is the scholarship of Professor Pushaw, supra note 2, at 1177.
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process of drawing legislative districts—first through the one person,
one vote rule, later through its interpretation and enforcement of the
VRA. Again, this is not the story we want to retell here. Instead, we
focus on the story of how something similar has happened in the
realm of election administration in the last ten years. Just as we can
divide redistricting into the pre-Baker and post-Baker eras, we can
divide election administration into the pre-Bush and post-Bush eras.
In each “pre” era, the election law issue was left to the states. In the
“post” eras, there is a substantial federal footprint on the issue—and,
specifically, active judicial superintendence of redistricting and
election administration, respectively. 47
What accounts for the larger federal footprint in election
administration in the post-Bush era? It is not that issues like voting
equipment, voter ID, and voter registration were considered
nonjusticiable political questions. The Constitution does not textually
commit the resolution of these questions to the political branches, and
the Equal Protection Clause furnishes a judicially manageable
standard, if not a bright-line rule. 48 The reason that questions of
election administration did not occupy much of the federal courts’
time and attention before Bush is that virtually no one considered the
possibility of constitutional challenges to practices like the counting
of hanging-chad ballots, the use of unreliable voting equipment, or
the disparate treatment of provisional and absentee ballots.
Bush can be understood as the new Baker, in the sense that it
opened the federal courts to election administration litigation, just as
its predecessor opened the federal courts to districting litigation. So as
to avoid any misunderstanding, let us first state two qualifications to
this claim. First, we are not talking about citation counts. Baker has
been cited many times by the Supreme Court and the lower courts in

47 See id. (noting the tremendous impact that Baker has had on the ability of federal courts
to hear election law disputes).
48 Erwin Chemerinsky, has suggested that Bush involved a political question. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2001).
Shortly after the case was decided, he argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should have
remanded to the Florida Supreme Court, saying “an analogy can be drawn to the political
question doctrine.” Id. at 1111. We do not agree. As we have explained, the political question
doctrine is about separation of powers, not federalism, after Baker. Respect for state
sovereignty, including state courts power to decide issues of state law, therefore is not a reason
to hold a case nonjusticiable on political question grounds. Erwin Chemerinsky has also
suggested an argument based upon the Baker factors. Id. at 1107. The only clear textual
commitment to a coordinate branch, however, is Congress’ duty to count the Electoral College
votes, which was not implicated by the Court’s conclusion that Florida’s system for recounting
citizens’ votes violated equal protection. Nor was there a lack of judicially manageable
standards. As explained in Part III, we think the Equal Protection Clause provides a sufficient
standard, which was applied in cases before Bush as well as in cases that have followed it.
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subsequent years. 49 By contrast, the Supreme Court has been
exceedingly reluctant to cite Bush v. Gore, and there are not a huge
number of lower court cases that have cited the case either. 50 Second,
we are not talking about the intent of the Supreme Court, which was
quite different in these two sets of cases. The Baker Court was quite
conscious of the fact that it was opening the door, if not the
floodgates, to litigation over legislative districts. 51 The Bush Court, by
contrast, seemed intent on shutting the door behind it, by limiting the
principle upon which it sought to rely. This is most clearly evident in
the Court’s statement that:
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for
the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in
the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems
for implementing elections. 52
Some commentators have criticized these sentences for being
unprincipled, in the sense of declaring a rule of law good for one day
only. 53 We disagree. What the Court did instead was to (1) assert an
equal protection principle established by cases like Baker and
Reynolds, variously characterized as “equal weight” to each vote and
“equal dignity” to each voter and as valuing one person’s vote over
49 A Lexis Shepard’s report states that the case has been cited in 4251 decisions.
Shepard’s®
Report
for
Baker
v.
Carr,
https://advance.lexis.com/RedirectToShepards?requestid=8f77dc63-1ea0-4bd8-ac93bb733f86fabc (follow the “Shepard’s®” link on the Lexis®Advance opening page and search
“369 U.S. 186”).
50 The Shepard’s report for Bush reveals that it has been cited in 269 decisions, though not
at all by the U.S. Supreme Court. Shepard’s® Report for Bush v. Gore,
https://advance.lexis.com/Shepards/shepards/tab?requestid=98968e1c-33fe-45ad-b4055ef6183267d1&ContentId=tag%3alexisnexis.com%3ashepards%2f26b8e49d24024d6193097f4
349959ab9 (follow the “Shepard’s®” link on the Lexis®Advance opening page and search “531
U.S. 98”); see also infra note 66 and accompanying text (listing cases the Court cited to in Bush
for examples of the equal protection clause).
51 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 250 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
with approval a state court opinion arguing that when “by reason of passage of time and
changing conditions the reapportionment statute no longer serves its original purpose of
securing to the voter the full constitutional value of his franchise, and the legislative branch fails
to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of the courts must be open to him.” (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)).
52 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
53 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1016–
17 (2007) (listing a number of commentators who have espoused this view, including Steven J.
Mulroy, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Hasen). In deciding a disputed election for a U.S. Senate
seat in 2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have essentially adopted this view of
Bush as well. See Coleman v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 465–66 (Minn. 2009) (relying in part
on the limiting language quoted above to determine that Bush did not apply to that case).
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another by “arbitrary and disparate treatment”; 54 (2) apply this
principle to a new context, namely the recounting of punch card
ballots in the State of Florida; 55 and (3) conclude that this process
contravened this basic equal protection principle, without clearly
specifying its precise boundaries. 56 In other words, the Court applied
an established principle to a new area of law without specifying the
precise legal test or how it will apply to future cases.57 The wording
may be different, but the mode of analysis is not that unusual.
In this respect, Bush bears comparison to what the Court did when
it decided Baker and later Reynolds. The Court was certainly aware
that it was entering the political thicket in Baker. 58 It may have had a
general rule of law in mind, but it did not specify its precise
boundaries. And while Reynolds (like Bush) relies on a vaguely stated
principle of law, variously defined as “one person, one vote” 59 and an
“equally effective voice in the election of members of [the] state
legislature,” 60 it too does not define the exact boundaries of this
principle.
The Court in Reynolds was aware that it was entering a new area
without precisely specifying the bounds of the new equal protection
rule it articulated. This is evident in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s notes
on the case. These notes, in the Chief’s handwriting, include thirtyfour numbered, single sentence points on seven sheets of paper. 61
The first reads: “There can be no formula for determining whether
equal protection has been afforded.” 62 Another note, number twenty,
reads: “Cannot set out all possibilities in any given case.”63 In other
words, the Court that decided Baker and Reynolds—like the Court
that decided Bush—rested on a somewhat imprecisely stated
principle, allowing for refinement in future cases presenting different
facts.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 105–06.
56 Id. at 110.
57 For a relatively recent example of this, see, for example, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct.
1207, 1220 (2011) (“Our holding today is narrow . . . and the reach of our opinion here is
limited by the particular facts before us.”).
58 Cf. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (noting that “[c]ourts ought not to
enter this political thicket,” i.e. redistricting). The Baker Court rejected the appellees’ attempt to
rely on Colegrove. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202 (1962).
59 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quotations and citation omitted).
60 Id. at 565.
61 Notes made by Chief Justice Earl Warren on Reynolds v. Sims (undated and
unpublished handwritten notes) (copies on file with authors). The authors thank Paul Moke of
Wilmington College, who is writing a biography of Chief Justice Warren, for graciously
providing access to these notes.
62 Id.
63 Id.
54
55
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This also shows up in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the
Reynolds majority, which declines to say exactly how close to
numerical equality districts much be:
For the present, we deem it expedient not to attempt to spell
out any precise constitutional tests. . . . Developing a body of
doctrine on a case-by-case basis appears to us to provide the
most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed constitutional
requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment. 64
And later:
We do not consider here the difficult question of the proper
remedial devices which federal courts should utilize in state
legislative apportionment cases. Remedial techniques in this
new and developing area of the law will probably often differ
with the circumstances of the challenged apportionment and a
variety of local conditions.65
The similarity to Bush’s language is striking—and given that
Reynolds is one of just four equal protection cases cited in Bush, 66
one wonders whether it was conscious. The Court stated a broad
principle, declined to state precisely the test it was applying, and
bracketed other cases presenting different circumstances, reserving
them for another day.
Of course, the Reynolds Court did provide some clarity in the one
person, one vote cases that followed. So far, the current Court has
failed to provide comparable clarity for election administration cases
since Bush. And, in fact, in the most prominent election
administration case to have arisen since then, Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, 67 the Court did not cite Bush at all. Again, we
are not arguing that there is an exact parallel between Baker and
Bush. Our claim is more modest: that there is an important similarity
between the two cases in that both set the stage for an increased
federal role in their respective realms, redistricting and election
administration.
While the Supreme Court has avoided Bush v. Gore like the
plague—as others have noted, it has become the Voldemort of

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 585.
66 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05, 107 (2000) (per curiam) (citing Reynolds, as
well as Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963) and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)).
67 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
64
65
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Supreme Court cases, “the case that must not be named” 68—that does
not mean the case has been without an impact. Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s clear distrust of state institutions in Bush 69 (which is also
implicit in Baker) has apparently trickled down to the rest of the
federal courts, who are now taking a more active role in state election
disputes. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff has put it, Bush v. Gore
declared that “federal courts were open for business when it came to
adjudicating election administration claims.” 70 Lower courts “relaxed
rules regarding standing, ripeness, and . . . justiciability” 71 in order to
hear more election disputes. They allowed these cases to go to the
front of the queue, often deciding them on an expedited basis in the
weeks preceding an election. In some areas, like voting technology,
election litigation led to changes in how elections are run, even in the
absence of a binding decision on the merits. 72
Some of the changes are quantifiable. In the years since Bush, we
have seen a marked increase in federal litigation over the mechanics
of election. Richard Hasen has traced this increase in a series of
articles, noting that they go from 108 in 1996, to 197 in 2000, to 361
in 2004, and then down slightly to 297 in 2008.73 Most importantly
for our purposes, more of this litigation is taking place in federal
68 See Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case! The Precedential Value of Bush v.
Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141 (2006) (providing an overview of lower courts’ divided
decisions on whether to follow Bush v. Gore); Adam Cohen, Has Bush v. Gore Become the
Case That Must Not Be Named?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A18 (“The ruling that stopped
the Florida recount and handed the presidency to George W. Bush is disappearing down the
legal world’s version of the memory hole, the slot where, in George Orwell’s ‘1984,’
government workers disposed of politically inconvenient records.”).
69 See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2493–95 (2003) (noting “the Court’s explicit
distrust of the county canvassing boards conducting the recounts, and in its implicit but palpable
distrust of the Florida Supreme Court”).
70 Samuel Issacharoff, Judging in the Time of the Extraordinary, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 533,
540–41 (2010).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 2006) (reinstating litigation
challenging “the use of unreliable, deficient” punch card voting equipment “in some Ohio
counties but not other counties”), vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (vacating panel
opinion because Ohio abandoned challenged election practices prior to en banc review);
Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying California
Secretary of State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in case challenging the use of punch
card voting equipment). For more on this litigation, see Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 5, at
1210, 1220–24 (detailing some of this litigation over election technology). See also Advisory
from Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner to All County Boards of Elections (July 23, 2009),
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Text.aspx?page=13670 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012)
(discussing how federal litigation led to a settlement agreement that required the Secretary of
State to revamp poll worker training statewide).
73 Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Docket, 2001–2010: A
Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court? 4 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished draft),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1780508.
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courts. At the start of the last decade, 80 percent of election cases
were filed in state court. 74 By 2008, that number was down to 54
percent.75 So Bush v. Gore did not just judicialize election
administration. It also federalized election litigation, moving much of
it from state to federal courts.
A qualification is in order here. It would be misleading to attribute
this rise in litigation entirely to Bush v. Gore. It was not just the case
itself, but the events that preceded it and those that followed it. Those
included the messiness of our election system exemplified by the use
of hanging-chad punch card voting systems in Florida and other
states, which the Court rightly predicted would lead to legislative
reconsideration of how our elections are conducted.76 It also included
the federal law that was subsequently enacted, the Help America Vote
Act of 2002. 77 While this is not the place for detailed explanation of
HAVA’s requirements, 78 suffice it to say that this was the most
extensive federal intervention in election administration in U.S.
history, imposing requirements for voting technology, voter
identification, provisional voting, and voter registration systems. 79
Since then, we have seen increased legislative activity in the states as
well, continuing through the present day. The year 2011 was an
especially active year, with a number of states adopting new statues
concerning voter identification, voter registration, and early and
absentee voting. 80
Bush was not the cause—at least the sole cause, of all this
activity—any more than Baker was the sole cause of the Voting
Rights Act and all of the activity surrounding redistricting that
followed. What happened before and after Bush was also important.
Both cases were, however, significant in a way that is impossible to
measure, precipitating an increased role for the federal courts in their
respective areas. A skeptic might note plaintiffs have lost many of the
cases challenging election administration practices in the post-Bush
era, including:

Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN L. REV. 69, 91 (2009).
Id.
76 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (“After the current counting, it is
likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and
machinery for voting.”).
77 Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006).
78 For a more detailed account, see Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 5.
79 Id. at 1214–20 (overviewing provisions of the Help Americans Vote Act of 2002).
80 For a critical discussion of these laws, see Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit
of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 (2012).
74
75
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x
Challenges to the refusal to count wrong-precinct
provisional ballots in Florida, Michigan, Ohio and other
states in 2004. 81
x
Challenges to voter identification laws in Georgia and
Indiana. 82
x
Challenges to states’ alleged failure to match
information in state registration databases against other
databases, as required by HAVA, in 2008. 83
x
Norm Coleman’s equal protection challenge to
Minnesota’s process for counting absentee ballots in 2008. 84
All this is true, but there have been some significant successes as
well, including:
x
Challenges to restrictions on registration, including a
requirement that voter registration forms be on at least eighty
pound paper weight, resolved without litigation in 2004. 85
x
Challenges to intercounty disparities in the application
of voter identification requirements in 2006, in Ohio. 86
x
A challenge to an early version of Georgia’s voter ID
law, which caused amendments making it easier to obtain one
free of charge. 87
The bottom line is that federal courts are now actively policing
election administration, in a way that they were not doing before Bush
81 Sandusky Cnty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (Ohio);
Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1074–75 (N.D. Fla. 2004); Bay Cnty.
Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410–11 (E.D. Mich. 2004). For more on these
cases, see Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 5, at 1228.
82 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Steve Visser, Voter ID
Law Disputed Again, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., May 30, 2008, at D6.
83 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Mahal v. Brunner, No. 2:08–cv–00983, 2008 WL 4647701 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 20, 2008); Alex Brousseau, Van Hollen Voter Registration Suit to Appear in Court
Today,
BADGER
HERALD,
Sept.
24,
2008,
http://badgerherald.com/news/2008/09/24/van_hollen_voter_reg.php; Aaron Gould Sheinin &
Julia Malone, State Responds to Voter ID Challenge, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Oct. 15,
2008, at C7.
84 Coleman v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009).
85 See Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 5, at 1227–28.
86 Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, No. C2–06–896, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78158 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2006), rev’d in part, motion denied by, motion granted by Ne. Ohio
Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006).
87 See Democratic Party of Georgia., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2011) (describing
how the Georgia legislature essentially changed the voter ID law so that “the fee charged for a
State-approved voter ID card was eliminated” after the original law was challenged in federal
court).
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v. Gore. And even aside from the important cases in which plaintiffs
have prevailed, having a policeman around the corner can make a
difference. In a world where partisan election administration is the
norm, it is important for those officials to know that federal judges—
who enjoy a political independence that state officials, including most
state judges lack—are looking over their shoulders.
III. THE FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
This brings us to our normative claim: that it is a good thing that
we are seeing more election litigation in the federal courts. To
understand why, a bit of comparative perspective is helpful. The
United States is an outlier among democratic countries, both in its
decentralization of election administration and its partisanship in the
process. We have not just one system of election administration or
even fifty, but thousands—sometimes thousands within a single
state. 88 Moreover, almost all state election authorities and many local
election authorities are partisan, in the sense that they are elected or
selected based on their partisan affiliations. 89 The vast majority of
state chief election officials are elected as nominees of their parties,
and most of the rest are selected by a partisan official. 90 Things are a
bit better at the local level, but not much. Many local election
authorities are run by party-affiliated officials. 91
Our system is not the norm among democratic countries. Most
now have an independent election commission, insulated from the
party or parties that control the central government. Examples include
the independent electoral commissions of Australia, Canada, and
India. 92 In other countries (20 percent), the election authority is part
of a bureaucracy that enjoys a functional if not formal independence
from the government. 93 Many of these are in highly regarded
democracies like Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 94 Their
88 See, e.g., STEVEN F. HUEFNER ET. AL., FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 39 (2011)
(noting that Wisconsin has “1,850 autonomous municipal-based elections jurisdictions . . .”).
89 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127, 131–32 (2009) (discussing an overview of partisan affiliations
of state election officials).
90 Id. at 127 (observing as of 2008 that “party affiliated secretaries of state still are the
norm” in spite of controversial elections and that “partisanship . . . remain[s]” a “dominant
characteristic[] of American election administration”).
91 Id. at 131–32.
92 Id. at 139 (describing the Australian model); Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and
Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 113, 120–
21 (2010) (discussing Australia, Canada and India).
93 Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 89, at 139.
94 Id.

2012]

BAKER, BUSH, AND BALLOT BOARDS

987

success is probably attributable to having a cadre of professional,
career civil servants, giving them substantial insulation from partisan
politics. 95
American election officials generally lack such insulation. So do
many state court judges, many of who are selected as nominees of
their parties or otherwise have to face an election. 96 Even if they are
not formally party nominees, they have a conflict of interest by virtue
of being subject to elections, administered according to rules they will
be adjudicating. 97
Federal judges, to be sure, have their ideological and partisan
proclivities. 98 But Article III provides them a greater level of
insulation from partisan politics than that of either election officials or
state court judges. The federal courts are, accordingly, the institution
best suited to resolve controversies with a strong partisan valence, as
election administration cases almost always have. 99 This is true even
of state and local races, because federal courts must ensure that
federal constitutional rights are vindicated even in those races with no
federal import.
Ohio provides the best example of why federal judicial
involvement is so important. During the 2004 election, the state saw a
Id. at 140; Tokaji, Public Rights, supra note 92, at 121.
Almost 90 percent of state judges must stand in some form of election; for state courts
of last resort, there are nine states that employ partisan elections, while thirteen use nonpartisan
elections and eighteen use retention elections. Michael S. Kang and Joanna M. Shepherd, The
Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 71, 79 (2011). The other twenty-eight states rely on
appointment by partisan actors like the governor or legislature, though twenty-one states require
some sort of merit selection. Id. at 79. Additionally, six states utilize partisan retention elections,
while fourteen use nonpartisan retention elections, eighteen employ retention elections where
the judicial candidate runs unopposed but receive a majority of votes and nine states require
reappoint by the governor, legislature or a special commission. Id. This leaves only three states
that provide some sort of life tenure for judge’s on the state’s court of last resort. Id. at n.44
(Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island). Nearly half of states use partisan elections
for lower court judges. Id. at 79.
97 Cf. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 89, at 133 (making a similar
point in the context of election officials).
98 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Book Review, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 87
TEX. L. REV. 787, 807 (2009) (noting that federal judges often “appear to fall back on their
personal attachments” like political affiliation when deciding cases that are particularly political
in nature).
99 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in Election
Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1072 (2007) (discussing “salutary effects” of election
administration cases). The “salutary effects” noted by Professor Tokaji include “favorable
judgments that protected voting rights . . . [the] advance[ment of] reform . . .” and judicial
opinions that have “clarified the rules for voters, parties, and election officials.” Id. (footnotes
omitted). Cf. Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L. REV.
878, 883–890 (2001) (arguing that federal courts are the proper forum for redistricting litigation
for the same reason we have articulated in this context: federal courts are more independent and
the issues in these cases are highly partisan).
95
96
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series of disputes over such topics as provisional voting, absentee
voting, and voter registration that went before the federal courts,
many of them filed against controversial Republican Secretary of
State Ken Blackwell. 100 There were also a series of cases in 2008
arising from the tenure of Democratic Secretary of State Jennifer
Brunner. 101
Most recently, in 2010 and continuing through the present, we
have had litigation in both federal and state courts over a familiar
topic: whether to count provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct.
The Hunter/Painter litigation arose from a very close election for
Juvenile Court Judge in Hamilton County between Tracie Hunter (the
Democratic candidate) and John Williams (the Republican candidate)
and aptly demonstrates a “turf war” between federal courts and state
courts made possible by the repudiation of federalism in this context
by the Baker and Bush Courts.
The facts giving rise to Hunter are complicated, but we will
summarize them as simply as possible. After election day in 2010, the
Hamilton County Board of Elections found that Williams had
defeated Hunter by twenty-three votes. 102 But after the election, a
dispute arose concerning ballots cast at the correct polling location
but the wrong precinct—so-called “right church, wrong pew” ballots.
Twenty-seven people who had voted in-person absentee ballots were
given and cast the ballot for the wrong precinct, but the Board voted
to count these ballots because it concluded they were the result of
clear poll worker error. 103 Another 849 people who voted in the
wrong precinct but right polling place on election day did not have
their ballots counted.104 On November 21, 2010, Hunter filed a
federal lawsuit, arguing that the Equal Protection Clause required that
those who voted in the wrong precinct on election day have their
100 Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 5, at 1220–39 (discussing the Ohio cases and
underlying issues).
101 See, e.g., Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 582 F. Supp. 2d 957 (S.D. Ohio 2008),
stay denied, 544 F.3d 711 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated by, stay granted by 555 U.S. 5 (2008); State
ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 588 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Ohio 2008), vacated and remanded by 549
F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2008), rehearing in No. 2:08–cv–1077, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92890 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 18, 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2010); State ex rel. Stokes v. Brunner, 898
N.E.2d 23 (Ohio 2008); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir.
2008) (affirming in part and reversing in part a series of lower court decisions). This last case
caused Secretary Brunner to enter into a settlement with the League of Women Voters that
resulted in a massive overhaul of poll worker training in the state of Ohio. See Advisory from
Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner to All County Boards of Elections, supra note 72
(describing the settlement).
102 See State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 941 N.E.2d 782, 787 (Ohio 2011) (“The board’s
final count indicated that Williams had won the election by 23 votes.”).
103 See id. (referring to the twenty-five ballots).
104 See id. (referring to the 849 ballots).
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votes counted if it was due to poll worker error.105 The next day, the
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring the
Board to begin an investigation into whether the 849 wrong-precinct
ballots cast on election day were the result of poll worker error. 106
Then-Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner proceeded to issue
directives to facilitate the court-ordered investigation. 107
These directives led Williams’ supporters to file a petition in the
Ohio Supreme Court on December 20, 2010, challenging Brunner’s
directives and arguing that all these wrong-precinct ballots should be
rejected. 108 They also argued against Hunter’s equal protection claim,
already pending in federal court. Specifically, they sought to rescind
an order from Secretary Brunner, requiring investigation of 849
wrong-precinct ballots. 109
The justices of the Ohio Supreme Court are elected. Although the
party affiliations of judicial candidates do not appear on the general
election ballot, the nominees are selected through partisan primaries.
Ohio Supreme Court justices are, therefore, elected as nominees of
their party, even though voters do not necessarily know the judicial
candidates’ affiliation when they vote in general elections.
Republicans enjoyed a 6-1 majority on the Ohio Supreme Court at the
time.
Hunter moved to have the U.S. District Court enjoin the Ohio
Supreme Court proceedings, but those motions were denied. 110 Then
things got really interesting. On January 7, 2011, the Ohio Supreme
Court agreed with the Williams camp’s claim that Ohio law did not
require the wrong-precinct ballots to be counted. 111 The majority
concluded that Brunner’s directive violated state law–a conclusion
that was squarely within its authority–but it went further, asserting
that “the United States Constitution ‘leaves the conduct of state
105 Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10CV820, 2010 WL 4878957 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 22, 2010). To find the filings in this case see Archive of Court Documents, Hunter v.
Hamilton Cnty. Board of Elections, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (last updated Apr. 2, 2012),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/Hunter.php. To find the filings in the parallel
state court litigation, discussed below, see Archive of Court Documents, State of Ohio ex re.
John W. Painter and John Williams v. Jennifer L. Brunner, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (last
updated
Apr.
2,
2012),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/StateofOhiovBrunner.php.
106 See Hunter, 2010 WL 4878957, at *5 (ordering the injunction).
107 See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 227–28 (6th Cir. 2011)
(discussing the issuance of the directives).
108 See State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 941 N.E.2d 782, 791 (Ohio 2011) (discussing the
petition).
109 See id. (discussing the petition).
110 See Hunter, 635 F.3d at 224–28 (discussing the denied motions).
111 See Painter, 941 N.E.2d at 793–94 (“[T]here is no exception to the statutory
requirement that provisional ballots be cast in the voter’s correct precinct.”).
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elections to the states.’” 112 The state supreme court claimed to have
no obligation to adhere to lower federal court rulings on federal-law
questions raised in the case: “[W]e are not bound by rulings on
federal statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court other
than the United States Supreme Court.” 113 While it did not explicitly
rule on Hunter’s equal protection claim, still pending in federal court,
it did opine on what the proper remedy would be if there were a
constitutional violation, saying that “[a]t best, any equal-protection
claim would have merely required the same examination” that was
previously conducted for the twenty-seven wrong-precinct early
votes. 114 Accordingly, the Court ordered that the board perform
“exactly the same procedures” as were applied previously—and
nothing more—with no presumption of poll worker error. 115
The problem with this decision is twofold. First, the Ohio Supreme
Court improperly reached out to rule on the proper remedy for an
issue of federal law that was then pending before a federal court. This
threatened to create a conflict—and arguably did create a conflict, as
explained below—between federal and state courts. 116 For it was up
to the federal court to decide not only whether equal protection had
been denied, but also what the proper remedy for any violation should
be. 117
Second, the Ohio Supreme Court was wrong to assert that it was
required to answer only to the U.S. Supreme Court, not to lower
federal courts. In fact, the federal courts could, if necessary,
effectuate their orders by issuing an injunction against state-court
proceedings. This would fall within an exception to the AntiInjunction Act (“AIA”) 118 for federal court orders against state court
judges. The AIA generally forbids federal courts from enjoining state
court orders, but contains several exceptions, one of which is for
injunctions against state courts that are needed “to protect or
effectuate [the federal court’s] judgments.” 119 The state court itself
112 Id.

at 793 (quoting Warf v. Bd. of Elections, 619 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2010)).
at 797 (quoting State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001)).
114 Id. at 798.
115 Id.
116 See Edward B. Foley, Ohio Provisional Ballot Case: What is Going On?, ELECTION
LAW
@
MORITZ
(Jan.
14,
2011),
http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=8055 (noting that the state and federal
orders in the Hunter/Painter litigation “are in significant tension with each other (to put it
mildly)”).
117 See infra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the District Court’s order).
118 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
119 Id.; cf. Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, supra note 99, at
897–99 (arguing that the AIA will allow federal courts to maintain “the upper hand in
redistricting litigation”). While the federal court in Hunter did not technically issue a
“judgment” prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, it appears that preliminary injunctions
113 Id.
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would enjoy sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment but,
under Ex Parte Young, 120 a plaintiff seeking to enjoin a state court
order in violation of federal law could name state judges as
defendants. 121 Under an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that was
enacted in 1996, an injunction may not issue against a state judge
“unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” 122 So if a state court order conflicts with a federal court
order, the proper procedure would apparently be for (1) the federal
court to issue a declaratory judgment against the relevant state judges,
declaring that the state court order is in conflict with the federal court
order and should be withdrawn; and (2) if the state court order is not
withdrawn, for the federal court to issue an injunction against the
state judges requiring that the order be withdrawn. Fortunately, things
have not yet degenerated to this point in Ohio. But the availability of
declaratory and injunctive relief against recalcitrant state court judges
demonstrates that the Ohio Supreme Court was incorrect to assert that
it was not bound to follow rulings of a lower federal court on matters
of federal law. If push came to shove, a federal district court would
have the power to issue an injunction against state court judges, to
enforce its judgment on a matter of federal law.
After the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, the matter returned to
federal district court. Chief Judge Susan Dlott found an equal
protection violation and, as a remedy, ordered that 165 ballots be
counted and that others be investigated. 123 While the Ohio Supreme
Court’s prior order is somewhat ambiguous, it appears to conflict with
the subsequent federal injunction. Recall that the state court requires
that these ballots receive no more than the “same examination”
conducted for the twenty-seven wrong-precinct ballots that were
initially counted. 124 The federal district court’s injunction requires
something more than the prior state court order permitted. Thus, it
was arguably impossible to comply with the federal court order

and orders are considered “judgments” for purposes of the AIA. See TechnoSteel, L.L.C. v.
Beers Constr. Co., 271 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing reviewable decisions); NBA v.
Minn. Prof’l. Basketball, Ltd. P’ship, 56 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a
preliminary injunction is considered a judgment under the AIA); Henry v. First Nat’l Bank, 595
F.2d 291, 306 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1975)
(same).
120 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
121 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984) (judges do not enjoy immunity
from claims for injunctive relief under § 1983).
122 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 535 (5th ed. 2007).
123 See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 230 (6th Cir. 2011)
(describing the District Court order).
124 State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 941 N.E.2d 782, 798 (Ohio 2011).
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without violating the state court order. But no one seems to have
questioned the obligation of local election officials to comply with the
federal court order, whether or not it conflicts with a state court order.
The Sixth Circuit upheld most of Judge Dlott’s order, though it
vacated her decision on the specific number of provisional ballots to
be counted and remanded for further proceedings on that question. 125
The portion of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion that has gotten the most
attention is its application of Bush v. Gore to the counting of some
wrong-precinct ballots but not others, concluding that the Board’s
action violated equal protection. 126 And this equal protection ruling is
certainly important, perhaps “the most significant application of
Bush v. Gore” to date, as Edward Foley has argued. 127 But equally
significant is what the Sixth Circuit said about the tension—if not
outright conflict—between the Ohio Supreme Court and federal
district court: “It is not for the state court . . . to resolve . . . equalprotection claim[s] previously filed and still pending in federal
court.” 128 This is absolutely right. It was for the federal court to
determine not only whether federal law had been violated, but also
the proper remedy for a violation of federal law.
This aspect of the federal courts’ decisions, however, became the
focal point of the en banc petition filed by Hamilton County. That
petition began with the assertion that: “The panel has made the
district court the final arbiter of whether a particular ballot will be
counted—contrary to Ohio law and the functions traditionally
performed by state and local officials.” 129 On the next page, it asserts
that the decision “intrudes into the power of the states and their
handling of federal, state and local elections.”130 Although the county
did not expressly invoke the political question doctrine or advocate a
return to the pre-Baker understanding of justiciability, that was the
functional import of their argument. The response to the en banc
petition recognized this, invoking Baker for the principle that: “It is
well-settled that cases involving alleged violations of the
constitutional right to vote are justiciable in federal court.” 131
125 See

Hunter, 635 F.3d at 222 (for the court’s holding).
id. at 234–38 (discussing the equal protection issue); see also, e.g., Owen Wolfe, Is
Intent to Discriminate Required in Bush v. Gore Cases?, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Apr. 13,
2011), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/110413_wolfe.pdf (discussing the decision’s
application of Bush v. Gore).
127 Edward B. Foley, A Major Ruling on the Meaning of Bush v. Gore, ELECTION LAW @
MORITZ (Jan. 27, 2011), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=8099.
128 Hunter, 635 F.3d at 239–40.
129 Petition For Rehearing En Banc of Defendant/Appellant at 1, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty.
Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 1:10–cv–820).
130 Id. at 2.
131 Response of Intervenor-Appellee Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless to
126 See
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The Sixth Circuit rejected the petition for rehearing without a vote,
and the Supreme Court denied a stay of the mandate without opinion
or dissent. 132 The matter then returned to the district court, which
conducted a trial in the summer 2011. On February 8, 2012, over a
year after the federal complaint was filed, Chief Judge Dlott issued a
permanent injunction, concluding that the Board denied equal
protection in rejecting some provisional ballots that were cast in the
wrong precinct due to poll worker error. 133 But stay tuned: Hamilton
County has appealed.134 That appeal is still pending, but the Sixth
Circuit has declined to stay Judge Dlott’s decision pending the appeal
and, following that decision, Tracie Hunter was declared the winner
of the election after the previously rejected provisional ballots were
counted in compliance with the federal court order.135
To be sure, the Hunter/Painter chain of events is unusual. Rarely
has the tension between federal and state courts been so apparent.
But it is quite possible that we will see more such conflicts in the
future, given the expanded federal footprint in election administration
and the federal courts increased (and in our view laudable) inclination
to intervene in this area.136 It appears that we are likely to see similar

Appellants’ Petitions for En Banc Review at 2, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635
F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 1:10–cv–820) (citation omitted).
132 See Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections v. Hunter, 131 S.Ct. 2149 (2011) (for the Supreme
Court’s denial).
133 Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10CV820, 2012 WL 404786, at *47
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2012) (for the court’s holding).
134 The Hamilton County Board of Elections deadlocked on party lines on whether to
appeal—predictably, with the two Republican board members voting to appeal and the two
Democrats voting not to appeal. The tie was broken by Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted (a
Republican), who voted with the Republican board members. See Husted Votes to Appeal
Ruling
in
Judge
Election,
NEWS5
(Feb.
21,
2012,
5:35
PM),
http://www.wlwt.com/politics/30510450/detail.html (discussing the decision to appeal).
135 See Dan Horn, Hunter Finally Declared Winner in Judge Election, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER,
April
27,
2012,
http://communitypress.cincinnati.com/article/AB/20120427/NEWS/304270171/Hunter-finallydeclared-winner-judge-election?odyssey=nav%7Chead.
136 Even more recent events in Ohio, taking place shortly before this article went to press,
provide an example. After their setback in Hunter, Ohio Republicans went to state court seeking
to prevent compliance with a federal consent decree pertaining to “right church, wrong pew”
provisional ballots. Specifically, Ohio Senate President Tom Niehaus and Speaker Pro Tem
Louis Blessing sought a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court, which would have
prevented Ohio Secretary of State, Jon Husted from complying with the terms of the consent
decree in NEOCH v. Brunner (now NEOCH v. Husted). See Compl. For Writ of Mandamus,
Niehaus v. Husted, No. 12-0639 (Ohio Apr. 16, 2012), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NiehausandBlessing.pdf.
Broadly
speaking, the NEOCH consent decree requires that provisional ballots cast at the wrong precinct
due to poll worker error be counted, so long as they were cast at the correct polling location.
Plaintiffs in NEOCH then sought an injunction from the federal district court, to prevent the
litigants in the mandamus action from proceeding in the Ohio Supreme Court. The NEOCH
plaintiffs argued that a state court has no authority to restrict individuals from complying from a
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conflicts between federal and state court authority over elections in
the future in other states as well. And if we do, federal courts do and
should hold the trump card. They do because they have the power to
enjoin conflicting state court orders, if necessary to effectuate their
own judgments. They should because federal judges are insulated
from politics in a way that state judges generally are not.
Accordingly, they do not have the same conflict of interest to which
state judges are subject.
The broader point is that the federal courts’ larger role in policing
election administration during the past decade is desirable, for similar
reasons that the federal courts larger role in redistricting five decades
ago was desirable. In both instances, state and local officials could not
be trusted, because they were not disinterested actors. The increased
federal judicial involvement in election administration is a good
thing, because we lack any other institution with a comparable degree
of independence from partisan politics.
CONCLUSION
Baker and Bush set the stage for greater federal court involvement
in the areas of districting and election administration, respectively. In
the earlier age, Luther v. Borden rejected the notion that federal courts
have “the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a
State are entitled to,” 137 reserving such authority to the states. Baker
took state sovereignty off the table as a reason for applying the
political question doctrine, with respect not only to malapportionment
but also to other electoral issues. Bush’s intervention in state and local
vote counting contributed to the increased federal court involvement
in overseeing how elections are administered—a role that can
increasingly be expected to create tension with state courts, which
until recently had primary if not exclusive authority over such

federal court order. They also argued that an injunction against state court proceedings was
permissible under the Anti-Injunction Act’s exceptions. See supra notes, 118–22 and
accompanying text. The federal district court issued the requested injunction, and the petitioners
in the Ohio Supreme Court case dismissed their suit in order to avoid being held in contempt by
Judge Marbley. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, GOP Chiefs Bow to Judge, Withdraw Ballot
Lawsuit,
THE
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH,
May
12,
2012,
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/12/gop-chiefs-bow-to-judge-withdrawballot-lawsuit.html. Had the state court litigation been allowed to proceed, it could have led to
an even more serious conflict between federal and state courts than the one in the HunterPainter litigation. For a more thorough description of the issues raised by the Niehaus petition,
see Owen Wolfe, Provisional Ballots, Consent Decrees, and the Balance Between the Federal
and
State
Governments,
ELECTION
LAW @ MORITZ,
Apr.
26,
2012,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=9163
137 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 41 (1849).
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matters. To this date, the Hunter/Painter litigation is the most
prominent example of such tension in the post-Bush era.
The greater federal court footprint in election administration,
embodied in Hunter, may trouble those who think that this area
should remain a matter of state law and local practice. There is no
small irony in the fact that the Supreme Court justices most closely
associated with a respect for state sovereignty paved the way for these
developments with their decision to intervene in Bush v. Gore. But we
think the increased federal court scrutiny of election administration is
a salutary development, given the greater insulation that federal
judges enjoy from partisan politics, in comparison with most election
officials and state court judges.
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will pull back on
the reins but, so far, it does not seem eager to revisit this area. As long
as that remains the case, we can expect to see an increasing federal
judicial footprint in election administration. This may lead to greater
tension with state courts, as well as state and local election officials.
But from our perspective, that is a healthy tension.
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